Introduction
What is information? One common definition is that it is the result of gathering, processing and organizing data in a way that adds to the knowledge of the receiver. 1 We know that more information will become available at different points of a concept's development. We also know that the precision of information with respect to cost estimates will increase as the project is developed, until all uncertainty is resolved at completion. However, some uncertain elements also relate to project benefits, and this is information that, for a large part, will only be available after project completion. It can nevertheless have an impact on the ranking of project alternatives upfront.
What is interesting here is that it implies that obtaining information requires some effort, i.e. that costs are involved. Obviously, some information is worth the cost and some is not, but how can one decide? Also, how should the knowledge provided by new information be used in assessment of various project concepts?
Thus, some types of information may be available before crucial decisions are made, whereas other types of information will only be revealed in time, after the decision-making process. This is the background to this chapter, which investigates three questions: How much should we be willing to pay for new information? And how should we treat new information coming before major decisions analytically in ranking project alternatives? And finally, what about information that only will be revealed after project completion, how should this be treated analytically in ranking project alternatives? Bayesian updating is a keyword relevant to the first two questions, while real options offer a useful analytical framework related to the last question.
Strengthening the information basis
The issue of strengthening the information basis leads naturally to the questions, how and, to what extent. Before attempting to answer these questions, the traditional approach to estimating relevant values should be examined. Very often, this is to assess a 50/50 estimate, supported by a low and a high estimate.
Uncertainty with regard to key variables essential to major decisions is obviously highest when the process of assessing project values commences, but will gradually reduce as existing information is processed and new information is collected. Samset and Sunnevag (2008) refer to a Norwegian Official Report (NOU) which evaluates reasons for cost overruns on the Norwegian Continental Shelf (NOU 1999:11) 2 Figure 1 .Here, when the oil companies present their plan for development and operations of an oil field to the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy for approval, i.e. at the end of the early phase, the total standard deviation for the project will have been reduced to 20%. For some components, however, the standard deviation will still be around 40%. As planning commences, this span will obviously be much higher, but as the project "matures", it will become more detailed, and more precise estimates will be possible. This is illustrated in below.
This process of gradual reduction of uncertainty, and the corresponding increase in estimate precision, can be attributed to several factors. Firstly, the project becomes more detailed. This enables more precise use of existing data sources. Secondly, as time passes, more information relevant to the project will be revealed, and uncertainty accordingly diminishes. This will have a potential impact on prior estimates.
Figure 1 The gradual process of reducing uncertainty as project planning proceeds
Returning to the particular challenges faced in relation to upfront decision-making: In Figure  2 , a distinction is made between two decision points. The front-end phase is defined as the period leading up to a decision between at least one realistic investment alternative to the zero alternative (doing nothing). If a decision is taken to proceed with a project different from the zero alternative, this project will have to be detailed to such an extent that the final investment 2 Report from a Committee appointed by the Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy. decision can be made, and building commence. The particular challenges at the front-end decision point are illustrated in Figure 2 .
Figure 2 Challenges in making a choice between two concepts where estimates overlap
Here the front-end decision point is placed at a point in time where it is relatively clear-cut which alternative realizes the highest total net value, measured, as net present value (NPV). There is still room for surprises, but even more so, had the decision point been earlier on, where the high estimate for project B intersects the low estimate for project B.
With regard to value estimates, front-end decisions involving the choice between concepts may be more challenging (and more decisive) than subsequent decisions regarding the size of investment. One of the reasons is time, together with shortage of information. During the earliest phase, with scant information, and project alternatives that only exist as "rough sketches on the back of a fag packet", it is meaningless to use very sophisticated methods for assessment. To illustrate the type of rough, experience-based data that might be available, it could, for instance, be expressed as, "a road tunnel, with a certain width and length, in a specific type of rock, would typically cost in the range of $ to $$ per meter".
In addition, descriptions of the project alternatives may be imprecise. If each of the alternative concepts is only more or less vaguely defined, it adds to this problem.
In the total assessment, time will have the effect of increasing the span of possible outcomes, where these evolve more or less stochastically. This will particularly apply to input factors, whose value is determined by market forces. However, there will come a point when the decision-maker has to decide whether information is sufficient to make a choice between concept alternatives.
Additional problems arise when assessing the economic value of projects and project alternatives. Traditional techniques like Net Present Value (NPV) tend to discount future costs and benefits into today's values, using a discount rate that reflects project risk in order to assess the economic value of projects. It must be decided if a project contributes to increased wealth, and whether alternatives provide even greater wealth contribution. Obviously, this is a problem that involves uncertainty and the need to value decision-flexibility. Simultaneous interrelations between the uncertainties in cash flow estimates, the risk-adjusted discount rate, the optimal strategy and the results obtained also provide analytical challenges. Moreover, it can be argued that where the risk of a project varies throughout its life. there is no single correct discount rate.
In the following, a distinction is made with respect to the circumstances under which new information becomes available, i.e. how and when uncertainty is revealed. Uncertainty may be external or internal to the project. With external uncertainty, new information will become available in time, independently of whether certain actions are taken. Price uncertainty is a good example of this. With internal uncertainty, new information is only revealed if certain actions are carried out. In an oil field development context for instance, exploration drilling, drilling of appraisal wells and production testing are examples of actions that can reveal information, and alter ranking of project alternatives, thus creating option value, given the operating flexibility to make use of the information. 
New information during concept assessment
There are two important messages at the outset. The first is that new information has no value unless it can potentially alter a decision. Thus, if it has been decided to build a new bridge, and nothing can change that decision, it would be a waste of resources to generate much information on costs. The focus should be to get more information on variables crucial to the decision.
The second point is that the marginal value principle should be used. This advocates that investment should be made in obtaining more information, as long as the marginal value of that information exceeds the marginal cost of getting it. These points will be explored further in the following sections.
Bayes' theorem (also known as Bayes' rule or Bayes' law) is a central result in probability theory that relates conditional probabilities. If A and B denote two events, P(A|B) denotes the conditional probability of A occurring, given that B occurs. In Bayes' theorem an initial probability estimate is known as a prior probability. When Bayes' theorem is used to modify a prior probability in the light of new information, the result is known as a posterior probability. The process of revising initial probability estimates in the light of new information, using Bayesian techniques, is illustrated with practical examples in Goodwin and Wright (2004) .
Assessing the expected value of imperfect information requires the decision-maker to judge how reliable the information will be, in order to obtain the conditional probabilities for the Bayes' theorem calculations. In some circumstances, this assessment can be made on the basis of statistical theory. In most cases, however, the assessment of the information's reliability will ultimately be based on the subjective judgement of the decision-maker.
Value of new information
It is possible to distinguish between perfect and imperfect information. Perfect information removes completely the uncertainty involved in a decision, whereas imperfect information has only a partial potential to reduce uncertainty in one or more of the underlying variables involved in a decision. To what extent uncertainty is reduced, depends on how credible the new information is.
The value of perfect information can be illustrated using an example from road construction. It may be assumed that the construction of a highway involves the building of a tunnel. There are three basic steps to building a safe tunnel. The first is excavation: engineers dig through the earth or rock using different tools or techniques. The second step is support: any unstable ground around the construction workers must be supported while they are digging. The final step occurs when the tunnel is structurally sound, and involves internal lining, the roadway and final installations such as the lights.
Before carving a tunnel, geologists and engineers investigate ground conditions by analyzing soil and rock samples, and drilling test holes. However, these activities involve costs. Performing a poor job here can have a huge impact on costs and safety during construction and use.
The engineers have two different construction alternatives for the tunnel. The first one is the shortest. However, there is substantial uncertainty with regard to ground conditions for this alternative. The initial cost estimate is € 500m., but if conditions turn out to be difficult, costs will increase by 50% to € 750m. For simplicity, a 50/50 chance can be assumed for each outcome. Thus, the expected value of costs for the short alternative is 0.5*500+0.5*750 = € 625m.
The alternative route is longer and costlier, but here the ground is well known, and geologists do not expect any surprises. The cost estimate for this alternative is € 600m.
The geologists have been asked to test whether ground conditions are okay. If the test shows conditions are difficult, the alternative route will be chosen. If the test shows that ground conditions are okay, then the short and cheapest route will be chosen. Since there is a 50/50 chance for each outcome, it is also a 50% probability that the test will show that conditions are fine, and vice versa. Thus, the expected outcome can be calculated if the geologists are asked to conduct the test. The expected costs, if the test is performed, is 0.5*500+0.5*600 = € 550m. 
Decision tree for tunnel example
The difference between the expected value without the test, and the expected value if geologists and engineers investigate ground conditions is € 625m. -€ 550m. = € 75m.
Even if it
is not yet known what the investigation will cost, it can be concluded that it should not exceed € 75m. -the maximum amount that should be paid for perfect information in this case.
What if there is uncertainty related to the new information, i.e. the information is imperfect?
Extending the example, the geological test is not entirely perfect -and can thus result in a wrong conclusion. There are still two different possible outcomes, which are equally likely to occur. The test performed by geologists correctly shows that ground conditions are okay in 90% of the cases where ground conditions actually are okay. However, in 20% of the cases where ground conditions are actually difficult, the test will erroneously show that they were fine. Figure 4 below presents this information in a structured format.
Before proceeding, Bayes' rule should be applied. This is central to discussions on the value of new, but imperfect information, and provides a way to update the initial assessment or probabilities, when new information becomes available.
There was an initial distribution of outcomes equal to 50/50. This is the a priori distribution of outcome. A usual way of defining the phrases "a priori" and "a posteriori" is "from what comes before" and "from what comes later", respectively. Thus, the "a posteriori" distribution is the probability distribution after new information.
Assume that P(B) assigns the probability that the test shows that ground conditions are okay . From the multiplication rule, the probability for B, can be expressed as:
according to the total probability law. Here A 1 is the event that ground conditions are okay, whereas A 2 is the alternative, that they are difficult. P(A 1 ) is the "a priori" probability for the event that ground conditions are okay. The conditional probability for event A i is:
When (1) is applied to (2), the outcome is:
which is also known as Bayes' rule.
Figure 4 Probabilities for the test to the correct answer
Thus, the probability that the test shows that ground conditions are okay is:
i.e. a 55% probability that the test shows that ground conditions are okay. On the other hand, the probability that ground conditions are okay, if the test shows so, is:
Consequently, new and uncertain information leads to a revision of the probability distribution. To what extent, depends on how credible the new information is.
To continue the example started in the previous section, the conditional probability must be known for the case that the test wrongly showed that ground conditions are difficult. D can be assigned to this event. First:
The probability that ground conditions are okay, but the test erroneously shows they are difficult, is:
The probabilities are now put into decision three, where a geological survey can be ordered, but the results of the survey have some uncertainty attached. At each chance node, the expected value is shown, and at each decision node, the value at that node is shown, given the optimal decision at that point. We now see that the expected value if we not perform the geological survey is €600 mill, whereas the expected value given imperfect information is €570 mill. Consequently, we should not be willing to pay more than is €30 mill for the survey.
The next step is to take a more general look at the impact of the credibility of the test on the the "a posteriori" probabilities that the ground conditions are okay. The figure below presents the prior probabilities, and the posterior probabilities that the conditions are okay, for the case presented above. In addition, two alternative cases are presented to illustrate the importance of credibility. In the first, the test is right in 99% of the cases, that the ground conditions are okay, and only tells wrongly that they are ok in 2% in the cases, where they are actually difficult. In the last case, the corresponding figures are 40 and 50%, respectively. In the last case, the test shows very little: it is more confusing than enlightening. This picture can be presented more generally. In the graph below, "a posteriori" distributions are seen as the function of four levels of credibility, varying from very low to very high. Returning to the tunnel example, as the project planning proceeds, the geology of the different project alternatives will be revealed through geological examinations, and the requirements for the tunnel itself will be more precise, e.g. with respect to outfitting and safety requirements. However, until uncertainty is completely removed, there will always be some room for surprises. How big these are, is determined by the quality of existing, and new qualitative and quantitative information sources. No less important, is how this information is used.
Knowing the conditional probabilities, the "a priori" probability distribution can be substituted by the "a posteriori" probability distribution. However, the calculation of posterior probabilities is a complicated procedure which needs a lot of information and requires intensive calculations. In practice, the decision-maker will have to allocate money and time to these activities, before it is possible to calculate the value of additional information. Also, it seems improbable that a decision-maker will be able to assess all likelihoods.
Rommelfanger (2003) points out that empirical surveys indicate that posterior probabilities are not applied when solving real decision problems: "Empirical opinion polls indicate that posterior probabilities are not applied in case of solving real decision problems". There are several explanations for this. One explanation is that in many real-world situations, the decision-maker is quite simply unable to specify a priori probability distributions. In order to improve the situation, the decision-maker could look for additional information. Another explanation is that the Bayesian framework requires advanced theoretical skills.
With this in view, Rommelfanger suggests the use of fuzzy decision theory to improve upon the situation. The objective of the fuzzy decision methodology is to obtain a decision based on attaining a set of goals while observing (i.e. not violating) a simultaneous set of constraints.
Fuzzy decision theory is based on fuzzy logic and fuzzy set theory. Fuzzy logic allows intermediate values to be defined between conventional evaluations, such as true/false, yes/no, high/low, etc. One of the most useful aspects of fuzzy set theory is its ability to represent mathematically a class of decision problems, known as "multiple objective decisions" (MODs). This class of problems often involves many vague and ambiguous (thus fuzzy) goals and constraints. The vagueness of expert judgement can be represented by probabilities here.
Fuzzy decision theory is particularly interesting as a decision support tool in the front-end phase. The reason is that fuzzy decision theory involves making decisions with imprecise information and measures. It deals with situations that might happen, as opposed to assuming situations that will happen. Uncertainty about probability is taken to be a form of (fuzzy) vagueness rather than a form of probability.
A lot of literature has emerged in this field, and the interested reader is referred to e.g. Wang et al (2007) .
New information after project completion
Investment like a tunnel, or building a bridge, is, to a large extent, irreversible or "sunk". In general, investment expenditures are often sunk cost when they are firm or industry specific. Bad news for one firm in an industry will often be so for others as well. If market conditions change significantly, it may not be possible to reverse the investment decision, or, at least, not without notable costs. The analytical challenges posed by specific, irreversible investments are not specific to the front-end phase, but one alternative has to be chosen, and very often this is a point of no return, at least where alternative concepts are concerned. If the alternatives differ significantly with respect to asset specificity, and flexibility to take account of changed conditions, the choice of a correct analytical approach may be crucial with respect to reaching the overall goal: to choose the project alternative that contributes the most to expected wealth-creation.
This section is concerned with information that will only be revealed after project completion. For a major road construction project, this could be the actual traffic on the road.
There may have been some qualified estimates, but the actual use will only be revealed with time, after the road has been built and put into operation. Obviously, this information has an impact on the estimate of benefits, which, when compared with costs, will be crucial to the decision as to whether to build the road, and its designed capacity. Another example can be whether to expand the capacity for public transport in a city, using light rail or buses. If demand conditions differ significantly from projections, buses offer a more flexible solution.
These two examples show that investment decisions share some important characteristics:
• investments are often partially or completely irreversible;
• there is uncertainty regarding future rewards from the investment;
• most investments have some flexibility with regard to timing;
• concept alternatives differ with respect to flexibility.
External uncertainty, flexibility, irreversibility and the possibility of delay are shared characteristics, all influencing the optimal decision.
The traditional method of assessing profitability is the Net Present Value (NPV) approach. Here, the investment is compared to the present value of future rewards from the project, having applied a risk-adjusted discount rate. If the net value is positive, the project will result in an increase in wealth for the shareholders (or the society, if this is a public construction project).
However, traditional methods of valuing revenue from investments can suffer from methodological difficulties. Traditional NPV analysis typically ignores flexibility. There is often some leeway about the timing of the final investment decision. It can be postponed to get more information about conditions important for the success or failure of the project. Furthermore, added value can, to varying degrees, be brought to the project through the management's ability to make operating decisions during the life of the project, i.e. to adjust the investment to existing market conditions as these change over time. Value can also be created through flexible development solutions. The degree of irreversibility can vary with the development concept. These issues come in addition to the challenge posed of finding the appropriate risk-discount rate for the project.
Real options approach
It is by now well known, that optimal investment rules can be obtained from methods that have been developed for pricing options in financial markets. Paradoxically, while uncertainty in the traditional NPV approach reduces value, through the increase in the risk adjusted discount rate, uncertainty in these valuation methods creates extra value to the flexible solutions. The extra value created through decision flexibility, or operational flexibility, is rarely quantified through traditional NPV approaches. However, experience has shown that the concept of real options provides a fruitful alternative valuation approach. But first, a few words on financial options.
A call (put) option is a right, but not a duty to buy (sell) the underlying asset. For a financial option, the underlying asset may be company stocks. There is a difference here between American and European options, where the right in the former case applies up to a specified date, whereas the right in the latter case can be exercised at the expiration date.
The close connection between a call option on a stock and the real option on a given project (i.e. public construction project) is illustrated in Table 2 below. The underlying asset in the case of a call option is the stock price; for an undeveloped project, it is the usage value or the revenues from the project. The last row in the table requires some special attention. The value and optimal exercise rule for a call option depends on the stock dividend rate. The holder of a stock call option does not receive dividends. The same applies to real options: the holder of a real option on a project does not receive the benefits from the project.
To deliver equilibrium, the expected net pay-off from the project (pay-outs plus capital gains) must compensate the owner for the opportunity cost of investing in the project. If authorities hold the option open to invest in the project, they will not receive the full benefit from the project.. The higher the operating pay-out, the greater the opportunity cost of holding the option open rather than exercising it.
The corresponding question at the investment decision point is whether information will be revealed that has an impact on the decision to invest or not. Waiting can have a value, in either case. The proper methodological framework must be applied in order to assess project flexibility, i.e. to correctly reflect the ability to adjust to changing circumstances in project values.
As mentioned, investments, e.g. building a tunnel or a bridge, are, to a large extent, irreversible or "sunk". If market conditions change significantly, it may not be possible to reverse the decision to invest, at least not without notable costs. This kind of irreversibility is not obvious in the front-end phase, but, nevertheless, one alternative has to be chosen, and very often this is a point of no return: reverting to an alternative concept may not be possible. In making this decision at the front-end decision point, one has to ask if there is a possibility that more information will be revealed with time, and in that case, will this information also have an impact on the ranking of alternatives?
The methodology is illustrated by a simple example. Since CO 2 emissions is a hot topic at the moment, the project in question relates to technology for CO 2 abatement. The government decides on the development of new technology for carbon capture and storage. Authorities are concerned that the country has to fulfill its obligations with respect to emission reductions. The annual obligations can be fulfilled either by investing in new technology and cleaning measures (e.g. capture and storage) or they can be fulfilled by acquiring quotas in the market. The plant has capacity to solve the government's annual obligation relating to the Kyoto target in the period 2008-2012, i.e. for five years. Alternatively, the country's obligations will be exceeded by 10 million tons of CO 2 emissions. Consequently, the value of the project depends crucially on the costs of acquiring CO 2 quotas. These can be obtained and traded in the market. Furthermore, it can be assumed that all uncertainty relating to the project's costs, and the efficiency of the technology, has been resolved.
The first step in the project is to develop a full scale capture and storage facility for CO 2 emissions, costing €1200m.. The quota price today is €30/ton. Thus, if the government commits and invests today, the annual cash-flow (saved costs of acquiring quotas in the quota market) will be 10 million tons * €30/ton = €300m. During the first year, however, only half of this can be stored and captured, so only €150m. will be saved in year 0. If the option to invest is kept open, it can be assumed that the investment occurs at the beginning of the year, with production commencing immediately, so that the full production value can be captured.
The traditional way to look at this is to calculate the Net Present Value, discounting future costs and the expected return using a risk-adjusted discount rate. In this case, the project (the technology) will be worth assuming that the technology can provide a (saved) cash-flow discounted for the remaining Kyoto period at the risk-adjusted discount rate, of 10%. The saved costs consist of the value of future saved emissions costs. The project is shown to have a negative expected net present value, and should be abandoned according to the traditional criterion, which is to only accept the project that has a positive NPV.
However, the timing option needs to be evaluated. The project can be initiated this year, or the following year, to see what happens with the quota prices. The option expires next year, so at that point it will be a "now or never" decision. This is not unrealistic in many investment cases, due, for instance, to logistical reasons, or legal rights which expire. When the option expires, the project is evaluated using the traditional NPV rule based on the current price next year (which may be high or low).
In this highly simplified example, there are only two possible outcomes next year: high demand for quotas, and low demand for quotas.
If demand for quotas is high, the CO 2 quota price will rise to €50/ton , but if demand is low, the price will only be €10/ton CO 2 . The probability for each outcome is equal, i.e. 50%. Thus, the expected price next year is €30/ton CO 2 . The risk free interest rate is 5%. The well known economist, Robert C. Merton, expanded mathematical understanding of how to value financial options. In his work published in 1973, he used the term "Black-Scholes" options pricing model, by enhancing work that was published by Fischer Black and Myron Scholes. The fundamental insight of the Black-Scholes option pricing model is that the option is implicitly priced if the stock is traded. A common way of modelling price in this context has been to assume that prices move in the same way as stock markets i.e. a random walk model.
Valuation of the project as a real option can now take place. To simplify, a binomial method is used for modeling outcomes. More sophisticated and realistic price development models are available. Hull (2003) for instance, presents some examples using Excel spreadsheets, where price is modeled more realistically for commodities markets, i.e. the price reverts around a mean. For this, he uses a trinomial mean reverting model for price development.
The project can be considered as an option to benefit if the quota price rises to the high level. But how much should this option cost? Obviously, the investment cost has its parallel in the option exercise price. Thus, in this case return is negative with -74%.
An essential concept in option valuation is risk-neutrality. In a risk-neutral world, the expected return must be equal to the risk-free interest rate, which in this case is 5%. Let p be the risk neutral probability for high demand. This probability can be found by solving:
Solving this expression, the risk neutral probability for high demand is 74%.
To find the value of a call option on this project, requires working backwards. If demand is high, the cash flow will be: Evidently, investment will not be made in this case. But the quota obligation still has to be fulfilled. If demand and quota prices are low, it may still be cheaper to meet the obligation by buying quotas in the market than it would be to invest. A delay means buying quotas in the market to fulfill this year's obligations. If quota price become €10/ton, the cost of fulfilling the obligations will be:
Thus, in this case it will be cheaper to buy quotas in the market. The figure below illustrates the pay-off in the two different outcomes:
The expected pay-off (using the risk neutral probabilities) in this risk neutral world has to be discounted to today's values using the risk free interest rate. Thus, the real option is worth 195-150 = €45m. and this should be paid willingly in order to acquire the right to develop a full-scale CO 2 capture and storage facility next year. Since the value of the facility developed at current prices is -€99m., the value of keeping the option open, i.e. to wait and see, is higher than the value of investing today. But it is obvious that abandoning the project altogether since the NPV is negative, is wrong. 
Option value and Net Present Value as a function of investment cost
The figure above presents option value and Net Present Value as a function of investment cost. The two curves for option value present value before and after the first year quota obligation, which has to be fulfilled if the investment option is kept open. The NPV curve falls, as expected, to the right, since higher investment costs implies reduced NPV. The option value curve is initially increasing to the right until slightly above €600m. The reason is that under this investment cost level, the investment will be undertaken in both the high and the low cost outcome. However, when the investment cost increases above this level, the option will not be exercised in the low price outcome, but only in the high demand outcome, and the curved part commences. It will be profitable to exercise the option in the high cost outcome up to a certain point, where the investment cost becomes so high that it will be better to buy quotas in the market. At that point, the curve will fall linearly (and parallel to the NPV curve) to the right. This is an example where information that will be revealed in the future will add value to the project, provided this information can be used in making a choice, in this case, whether or not to exercise the option to invest in the full scale facility.
In reality, many different types of options can exist. Hull (2003) mentions five different types of real options, often found embedded in projects. These are described in the table below. 
Concluding remarks
According to the Oxford Dictionary of English, data are "facts and statistics collected for reference or analysis", whereas information is "facts provided or learned about something or someone". These terms are usually regarded as parts of a process leading from the collection of data to acquiring information, and, finally, to obtaining knowledge, where knowledge, according to the same dictionary is "facts, information, and skills acquired through experience or education".
This process is particularly important -and challenging -in the early phase of development of project concepts and assessment, since information is limited and "rotten". Making the right choice between alternatives can make a huge difference in achieving the goals set out for the project.
Information will occur at different points in time during concept assessment. Some information may be obtained before crucial decisions are made, whereas other types of information will only be revealed with time, after major decision have been made. This purpose of this paper was to explore and illustrate some methodologies that can be used to take account of this, so that the chance of making the right choice between concept alternatives improves.
The first issue explored was the willingness to pay for new information and how to use the obtained information to update prior beliefs with regard to the probability for different outcomes. Bayesian updating provides a valuable tool in this respect, when information is perfect and also when there is still uncertainty, or new information becomes available.
The real option approach provides a valuable tool for taking account of information that will only be revealed after the decision between concept alternatives is made. However, even if the real option approach eventually becomes established practice in evaluating project alternatives, the theoretical, empirical and conceptual challenges should not be underestimated. There is no doubt that the approach provides valuable insight into crucial aspects of the decision-making problem, particularly in the early phase of concept assessment. For instance, a more costly, but also a more flexible, concept may stand out as the preferred alternative when assessed using the correct analytical framework. The methodology illustrates the structure of the decision-making problem, and provides insight into what may give extra value to different project alternatives.
